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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

FRED BUTZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

7441

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

;STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Parties will be designated as plaintiff and defendant.
All italics appearing in the brief are added.
Fred Butz, an employee of the defendant, 66 years
of age, was injured while engaged in the performance
of his duties as a switchman at the Union Station, DenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ver, Colorado, at 7 :55 o'clock A.M. on the 9th day of
September, 1948. He brought action under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act against defendant in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt
Lake County, Utah, and following presentation of the
plaintiff's evidence before a jury the Court granted
defendant's motion for nonsuit (R. 133, 134), and judgment was accordingly entered against the plaintiff.
In his com,plaint plaintiff alleged that he was injured while engaged with other members of his crew in
shoving a cut of three cars in a general westerly 'direction along the outside baggage track by use of a
locomotiye also facing westward, and while he was stationed on the sill step on the north side at the west end
of the lead car, and that he was injured as a result of the
negligence and carelessness of defendant in allowing
ten baggage trucks to be left along the platform adjacent
to and north of said outside baggage track in a position
so near the north rail of said track as to impair the
clearance and thus endanger men riding on the north side
of cars moving in a westerly direction along said track.

By answer defendant admitted that it was engaged
as a common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce
at the time of the accident and that plaintiff suffered
injuries, but denied that the injuries were occasioned
by its negligence, and affirmatively alleged that plaintiff's o~ contributory negligenc.e was the sole proximate
cause of hisjnjuries (R. 12, 13).
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Upon the admitted facts the remedy afforded plaintiff is controlled by certain provisions of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. For the convenience of the
Court these controlling provisions-, as far as material
here, are set forth herein:

Se_ction 51, Title 45, U.S.C.A.:
''Every common carrier by -railroad while
-engaging in commerce between any of the several
States * * * shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is em_ployed by
such carrier in such commerce, * * * for .such
injury * * * resulting in whole or ~ part from
the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or
employees· of such carrier, or by reason of- ap.y
defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its
cars, engines, ·app·liances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.''

Section 53, Title 45, U.S.C.A.:
''In all actions hereafter brought against any
such common carrier by· r:;tilroad under or by
virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to
recover dam~ges for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in
his death, the fact that the employee may have
heen guilty of contributory negligence shall not
bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury iri proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, that no such employee who may be i~jured
or killed shall be held to have been guilty of
contributory negligence in any case where the yiolation by such. common carrier of any -statute
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enacted for the safety of employees contributed
to the injury or death of such employee.''
At the ·conclusion of plaintiff's evidence defendant
made a motion for nonsuit, which the trial court granted
(R. 133, 134).
It will become readily apparent to this Court after
a review of the facts that the trial court committed
prejudicial and reversible error in granting defendant's
motion for nonsuit.
B. THE FACTS

Plaintiff, Fred Butz, at the time of his injuries,
was 66 years of age, with 45 years Qf railroading experience (R. 41), and was familiar with every track at the
Union Station and upon the Union Pacific system at
Denver, Colorado (R. 43).
The accident ~ausing his injuries occurred at approximately 7:55 o'clock A.M. on the 9th day of September, 1948 (lt. 33), on defendant's outside baggage
track at the Union !S~tation, Denver, Colorado (R. 1, 2,
11, 12). ·The outside baggage track extends in a genetal
easterly-westerly direction, with a loading platform adjacent to and north of said track. A few feet east of the
platform the said baggage tr~ck eircles to the northeast
(R. 42, Ex. "A").

O'n September 9, 1948 plaintiff reported for work at
approximately ;6:30 o'clock A.M. (R. 46). Shortly after
his arrival a p~assenger train came into the station and
it became tne duty of plaintiff's crew to shove three
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baggage cars from said train in a westerly direction to
and along the outside baggage track and to spot them
along the platform (R. -17). Plaintiff was working as a
fieldman.
It is the customary and usual procedure for the
fieldman to ride the point car in the direction of the
movement in order that he may keep a lookout ahead for
obstructions on the track and p·ass necessary sjgnals to
the engineer (R. 48, 53, 97). It was also customary for
plaintiff and other of defendant's em'P·loyees to ride cuts
of cars along and past the platform heretofore men.,.
tioned. In accordance with said custom plaintiff stationed himself upon the ~ill step located on the north
side near the west end of the leading car (R. 50, 51).
The haggage platform where the cars were ultimately to be spotted is used for loading and unloading
cars brought to the Denver Union Terminal hy the Burl. · ington, Colorado & Southern, Denver and Rio Grande,
Rock Island and Union Pacific Railroad Comp·anies.
On some days plaintiff and his crew would use the outside 'baggage track in spotting cars as often as six times.
On other days they wouldn't use the track (R. 49).
After cars from any of said railroads are spotted along
the rplatform, employees of the Denver Union Terminal
load and unload them before they are moved to their
next points of departure.
Baggage trucks are used in loading and unloading
cars stationed along the loading platform. These trucks
are approximately eight feet in length, three to three
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

and one-half feet in width and stand about three feet
from the ground, with end pieces extending up from
the decks an additional three to three and one-half
feet. They weigh from 500 up to 1500 pounds (R. ·52).
These trucks may be seen in Exhibits "A," "B" -and
''C.'' They belong to the Denver Union Terminal Company and are handled by employees of the Denver Union
Terminal Company (R. 102).
The cut of cars plaintiff was riding had proceeded
west ap·proximately two miles before it reached the platform where plaintiff was injured (R. 49). As the cut
ap'proached the platform and rounded the curve shown
in Exhibit "A," plaintiff observed a string of baggage
trucks standing lengthwise, and end to end, along the
platform, but continued to ride the sill step on the leading car as he believed that the baggage trucks were in
their usual position within the safety zone on the platform (R. ·53, 79).
A yellow line is painted along the platform as shown
in Exhibit "B" and "C" which defines the safety zone
for baggage trucks. Whenever these trucks are parked
between the yellow line and the south edge of the platform they constitute an impairment of clearance for men
'riding the sides of the cars along said platform and past
said trucks (R. 15, 16). While plaintiff was rounding
the curve he .was in, no position to sight along the platform and determine whether or not the trucks were
beyond the yellow line and in the danger zone. As he
rounded the curve, moved onto the straight track and
came abreast of the first of th·ese trucks he observed
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that they "~ere all beyond the yellow line and in the
dange·r zone (R. 55, 100). At that time the engine and
cars were proceeding at a speed of not less than five
miles per hour (R. 55). He had been looking ahead
along the entire track ( R. 101). ij:e testified regarding
the happening of the accident as follows (R. 56, 57) :.
''A. Well when I got right around the curve
to the straight track I was right up against these
trucks mostly. I didn't have enough time to
jump off because there wasn't enough room in
between there, between the baggage car and these
little trucks, so I tried to take my arms off to
give a signal and just at that time I couldn't give
a signal. I then tried to reach around the corner,
then one of the trucks hit me on the elbow.

Q.

Now which elbow~

A. Oh my right elbow, here along the back
when I hit this truck when I started to reach
around the corner and hit this truck why I hit
the fourth truck and then it pushed the fifth one
even in closer to the· track and then I had ahold
with both hands and I was so scared I tried to
get around the corner so I could .pass that and
the fifth truck hit me with all force in ~y side here
and in the hack and at particular time the engineer, the foreman of the crew, he seen what happened and he give the engineer the sign and I
think the engineer seen it about the same time
and he put on the air and stopp·ed.

* * * *
''A. When I seen these were too close I
squoze in and I made it by the three trucks when
I seen the fourth truck then I tried to get around
the corner of the car which I seen I couldn't
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make and I got hit by the fourth truck on the
elbow and just about that time I got to the fifth
truck and it struck me on my back.''
The first of said trucks was approximately ten feet
from the curve which he had to round before being
able to sight down the platform and determine the clearance between the track and the baggage trucks (R. 59).
Plaintiff did not step down onto the platform when he
first became aware that the baggage trucks were beyond
the yellow line because at that time he was passing the
first of said trucks and would have risked falling against
the trucks and under the wheels of the cut of cars.
It was impossible for him to swing around in front of
th·e cars because he didn't have sufficient time and doing
so would have involved considerable danger (R. 59, 60).
The corner of the fourth truck which struck plaintiff was approximately halfway between the yellow line
and the side of the car, which would place it six or eight
inches over the yellow line. The fifth truck which struck
plaintiff in the ba:ck was only six or eight inches from
the side of the baggage car (R. 68, 69). The point of
impact with the fourth truck is indicated by a dot and
the words "Point of first impact" on Exhibit "A."
Plaintiff had a good tight grip on the grab-iron at
the time he was struck by the haggage trucks and managed to hold onto the car until the cut was stopped. (R.
91).
After the accident plaintiff worked for an hour
and a half until his condition became such that he could
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no longer stand the pain (R. 60, 61). His switch key
had been driven into his right leg causing severe pain
(R. 61).
At the time of trial, almost five months after the
accident, he \Yas still unable to return to work. The
lower p·ortion of his back was still bothering him considerably and he had suffered permanent injury in the
area of his thigh where the switch key had entered (R.
63, 68, 113). Pr. Clegg testified that plaintiff had suffered a serious injury in the lower portion of his spine
(R. 106), which was aggravated and rendered. more difficult to heal by an osteo-arthritic condition (R. 108, 111,
112). Plaintiff's right elbow had been severly injured
and was still painful rendering his right arm difficult of
use at the time of trial (R. 109).
It is apparent from the above recitation of the evidence that the necessary elements of plaintiff's case
rested firmly upon a substantial evidentiary basis.
When plaintiff had rested, the defendant moved for
a nonsuit and the court _granted defendant's motion stating to the jury as his reasons for so ruling as follows
(R. 133, 134) :
"In view of the fact that you have put in
almost a day in this matter I think you are
entitled to some explanation why I am doing
that. The Plaintiff, of course, as an employee of
the Union Pacific Railroad Com'pany charges
the Union Pacific . was negligent and if you
will observe he was the man that was directing
the operation of this train out on the lead arid
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closest to these little baggage trucks strewn along
the right-of-way. But they were left over the
yellow line by the employees of the Denver Terminal Company, which the evidence shows is a
separate company from the Union Pacific and
there is no tie-in between the Union Pacific and
the Denver Terminal Company, so if there was
negligence it was negligence, not of the Union
Pacific Company's and its employees, but the
Denver Terminal Company. As you have probably observed in this case nobody is to be
charged with damages unless they have done
something through their employee or themselves.
Now we get to another feature of the case, as to
whether or not Mr. Butz was the cause of his
injuries and of course, if any one of these features is defective of course the Plaintiff is limited
to the granting of their motion. In all these cases
the Plaintiff must not only show that the Defendant was negligent and I am at a loss to find
how such conduct on the part of the Denver
Terminal Company, that is the Union Pacific
could be responsible for the conduct of the employees of the Denver Terminal Com~pany. So I
have granted the motion and your services won't
be ~eed~d any longer and you are now excused.''
STA!TEMEN'T OF POINTS
1. The trial court erred in granting defendant's
motion for nonsuit (R. 133, 134).
2. The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for new trial (R.. 34).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT (statement of Points 1 and 2).
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGEN·CE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS
INJURIES (statement of Points 1 and 2) .
. POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT WRON·GFULLY DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRE-D IN HOLDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT (statement of Points 1 and 2).

Where I{JJYb employee is sent on the premises· of
ooother to w~ork side by side with employees of :another
and suffers injury by reason of a;n unsafe condition crea.ted by the negligence of the owner -of the prem.ises or
(a)

the owner's servants, such negligence is imputed to and
becomes that of the

emp~loyer.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
The master's duty of exercising reasonable care in
furnishing its employees with a safe place to work is
__ personal to the master and nondelegable. 2. Sherman &
Redfield on Negligence, Revised Edition, Sections 193
and 202. The master's duty follows the servant to whatever place he is sent by the master to p·erform the duties
of his employment even though that place is upon property owned hv another and over which the master has no
control Porter v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 327
Ill. App. 645, 65 N.E. 2d 31; Ryan v. Tw'in C~ty Wholesale
G.rocer Co. a;nd; Minn. T'IYlJnSfer Ry. Co., 210 Minn. 21,
297 N.W. 705; Wegman v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 189
Minn. 325, 249 N.W. 422; Albert Miller & Co·. v. Wilkins,
209 Fed. 582, at page 584; Harding v. R:ailway Trwnsfer
Co., 83 N.W. 395; St-eller v. ·C. & N. W. Ry.. Co., 46 W~s·.
497, 1 N.W.112, 49 Wis. 609,6 N.W. 303.
Albert Miller & ·Co. v. Wilkins, 209 Fed. 582, 584
(7th Cir. 1913).
''That a master is bound to use reasonable
care to provide a safe place in which his servant
may work is now too well established to require
citation of authority, and it can make no difference, so far as the servant is concerned, whether
the master is using his own property or that of
another.''
In .the case at bar plaintiff was injured as a direct
result of a dangerous :condition created by leaving baggage trucks in a danger zone upon the baggage platform.
Defendant's duty toward plaintiff was continuing.
Plaintiff had no choice either over the 'Place where he
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was to 'vork or the "\Vorkmen "\vith 'vhom he was required
to ,v·ork.
e submit under the authorities, which will be
hereinafter cited, that the defendant railroad company
is chargeable 'vith and responsible for the unsafe condition of the prentises, and also for negligence which it
could reasonably anticipate on the part of emp~loyees of
the D·enver Union Terminal Company, which caused
plaintiff's injuries.

'T

In Porter v Terminal R . .Ass'n, supra, an action
brought under the Federal Employers-' Liability Act,
the employer was held responsible for the unsafe condition of the premises of a third person and over which it
had no control when its employee, in the course of his
employment, was injured while upon said premises,
as a result of their unsafe condition. An engine
plaintiff was riding struck a derailer - causing the
engine to be derailed. The derailer was rendered ~~ar
tially invisible by weeds which had been allowed to grow
in the vicinity.
"It is conceded by defendant, and the evidence is undisputed, that plaintiff was an employee of defendant at the time of the accident.
The statute under which suit is brought provides
in substance : 'Every common carrier by railroad
while engaging in (interstate) commerce * * *
shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in
such commerce * * * resulting in whole or in
part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason
of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars,- engines, ap·pliances, machinery,
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track, roadbed * * * or other equipment.' 45
U.S.C.A. Sec. 51. It is the duty of the Master
to furnish the servant with a reasonably safe
place to work. ·This duty also applies to machinery and instrumentalities used by the servant
in his work; and this duty follows the Master even
though the servant is sent upon the premises of
another to do his work. !This duty is non-delegable and affirmative, and must be continuously _
fulfilled and positively performed.''
(Citing many sui)porting authorities including W egmam
v. Grea,t Northern Ry. Co.,· supr-a, and Ryan v. Twin
City Wholesale Grocer Co., and Minn. Transfer Ry. Co.,
supra, which will be hereinafter set forth in detail).

- Ryan v. Twin ·City Wholesale Grocer Co. et ol., 297
N.W. 705 (Minn. 1941). Action for pe~sonal injuries
sustained by plaintiff while working for the defendant
railroad company on the premises of a grocery company
as a checker. Sacks of sugar had been piled in the grocery company's building by its employees. While plaintiff was removing a sack of s~gar, hecause of negligent
piling of the sacks, other sacks fell, injuring him. It was
contended that the railroad company was not responsible for the negligence of grocery comp~any employees
in stacking the sugar. 'The court supported a verdict
for the plaintiff and, discussing the absolute and nondelegable duty of a master to furnish its servants
a reasonably safe ~place to work, stated:
"It is true that appellant had had nothing
to do with piling of the hags which fell and
caused plaintiff's injuries. That was the work
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of the grocery con1pany alone. However, the
court eharged the jury : 'You are instructed that
for the purposes of this lawsuit · the Railway
Company would be liable for the consequences of
any negligent piling of the sacks of sugar by the
employees of the grocery eompany in the same
manner as if the piling had been done by the
employees of the railway con1pany in the ordinary
course of its business.' Error is assigned upon
this instruction. The instruction was correct on
the theory that plaintiff as appellant's servant
\vas entitled to a reasonably safe place wherein
to work. The grocery com,pany's building was the
one plaee wherein appellant directed plaintiff to
do all his work. Hence, its duty was to use ordinary care to see that it was a reasonably safe
place for that purpose. The court so instructed:
'It was the duty of the railway company under
the law to exercise ordinary care and caution not
to put Ryan to work in a place of danger or subject him to hazards or risks unknown to him or
not appreciated by him.' In view of the situation,
·appellant mt~;.st ~assume responsibi~ity if the sacks
of sugar were piled so negligently .as to endanger
its s-ervants who were required to w·ork in proximity thereto.''
It will be observed that in the Ryan ease the negligence of the grocery company's employees became and
was the negligence of the railroad com pany. It was not
negligence in failing to discover the improperly stacked
1

sacks of sugar, but negligence in the st·ackirn.g itself for
which liability attached.
This case cannot on any conceivable principle be
distinguished from the case at bar.
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Wegm·wn v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 249 N.W. 422,

423 ( S. Ct. Minn. June 23, 1933). Action for personal
injuries suffered by railroad employee while on the
premises of a telephone company as a result of negligence ~f the telephone company's employee resulting
in a collision between a motor truck and a motorcar and
trailer at a railroad crossing. It was contended that the
railroad company was not responsible for the neglect
of the telephone company's employee. The court held
. that the railroad

com'P~any

was responsible under the

Federal Employers' Liability Act, and stated:
''The next question is whether, if at all,
defendant can be charged 'Yi.th the negligence of
Latterall, the member of the telephone company's
crew whose negligen~e the jury has found, on
sufficient evidence, was the cause of plaintiff's
injury. Doubtless Latterall was a servant of the
telephone company. But that, under the circumstances, is no bar to charging defendant with his
negligence. While the operation was ultimately in
the interest of the telephone company, it was
nevertheless a railroad operation, one of rail
transportation, to the extent that the motorcar
and trailer were using the tracks of defendant.
They were so using it at the time of injury, and
their use resulted in the accident. From such a
railroad op~eration and such results, ·a railrooo
compaJY141 oam;not ·div-o"fice itself by contract. The
lrmo imposes ,a duty wh~c'h is nondelegable, lfUI1ii
an oblig•ation whiC'h cannot be so esoap:ed. That
has been held iln cases of outright and complete
le,ase. ''
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It will again be observed that the railroad company
is positively and unequivocally charged with responsibility for the n.egligent acts of a.n employee of a.nother
company 01)er which it had no direct me_an.s of control.
In McElroy r. Nashua & L. R. Corp., 4 Cush. 400,
50 Am. Dec. 794, 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 451, there was a connection by the defendant railroad with another railroad.
The injury was occasioned by the negligent operation of
a switch on defendant's railroad, making such conneC'tion, by ·a servant of the other railroad. The switch itself
was also provided by the latter. The defendant was held
liable for the negligence of the servant whose duty it was
to operate the switches. Chief Justice Shaw, in delivering the opinion of the court, said :

.

''The switch in question, in the careless or
negligent management of which the damage occurred, was a part of the defendant's road; * * *
and although , provided for and attended by a
servant of the Concord Railroad Col"1p'oration, and
at their expense, yet it was still a part of the
Nashua & Lowell Railroad (the defendant) and it
was within the scope of their duty (the defendant's) to see that the switch was rightly constructed, attended, and managed.''

Lovett v. c.allow,ay, 69 Fed. Supp. 532 (Ga. 1946).
In this case the court held that where an employee of a
railroad company was kille·d while employed in the
employer's yard by an engine of another carrier which
was negligently operated by an employee of su.ch other
carrier, the employee of the carrier whose act caused
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employee's death was an employee of defendant employer within the terms of the Federal Employers'
Liahility Act.
It will be observed that in the Lovett case, as in
many of the cases eited, the negligence was an affirmative
act on the pa'!t of the servant of another company for
which the employer railroad company was held responsible. This case is also undistinguishable from the case
at ha·r.
In the case of Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., 22 N.W.
2d 305 (Nebr. 1946) the following fact situation appeared: Plaintiff, an engine foreman in charge of a
switching crew, sought recovery for personal injuries
received by him in a narrow clearance between a· boxcar in defendant's service and the building of another
be,eause of alleged negligence of defendant, among other
things, in failing to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe
place in which to work. The Supreme Court of the :State
of Nebraska reversed and set aside a jury verdict for
the plaintiff, stating:
''Under such circumstances the failure of
defendant to have· engineers professionally redesign its system of tracks and move them farther
west after construction of the Casein Building
over which it had no control was not negligence."
The court distinguished numerous cases on the
ground that the building which constituted the impaired
clearance was on the premises and belonged to a third
party over whieh defendant exercise· no control. This
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case was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States and the decision is reported in 67 8. Ct . 598, 329
U.S. 654, decided February 3, 1947. The Supreme Court
of the. United States .rejected the contentions of defendant and reiterated the time honored and well-established principle of law that the duty of a master to
exercise reasonable care in furnishing a servant with a
safe place in which to perform his work is absolute and
nondelegable and follows the servant wherever lie may
go in the legitimate performance of the duties . of his
employment.
The Supreme Court of the United States clearly
held that the location of the building creating the unsafe
condition could well be a basis for liability. That court
stated:

'' * * * Petitioner was unfamiliar with the
area and its hazards; if there w_as a sign warning
of the danger, he did_-not see it; no effort was
made to warn him personally. The nearness of
the track t'o the building created an wn.sa~fe place
for work.-

* * * *
''The choice of conflicting versions of the
way the accident happened, the decision as to
which witness was telling the truth, the inferences
to be- drawn from uncontroverted as well as controverted facts, are questions for the jury. Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64
S. Ct. 409, 88 L.. Ed. 520; Lavender v. Kurn,
supra. O·nce there is a reasonable basis in the
record for concluding that there was negligence
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minded men might reach a different conclusion.
For then it would be an invasion of the jury's
function for an appellate court to draw contrary
inferences or to conclude that a different conclusion would be more reasonable. Lavender v.
Kurn, supra, 327 U.;S·. at page 652, 66 S. Ct. at
page 743. And where, as here, the case turns on
controverted facts and the credibility of witnesses, the case is peculiarly one for the jury. Washington & Georgetown R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U.S.
554, 572, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 1049, 34 L. Ed. 235; Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 .U.S. 54, 68,
63 S. Ct. 444, 451, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R.
967."

Schlueter v. Ea.st St. Louis Connecting Ry. ·Co·., 296
S.W. 105,112 (S. Ct. of Mo.1927). It appeared that the
plaintiff was injured while in the performance of his
duties as a switchman by derailment of the engine tender
while riding on the footboard of said engine over the
tracks of another company. It was contended that
inasmuch as defendant had no ·control or authority
to control the tracks and yard belonging to another
company it was not responsible for plaintiff's injuries.
The court, in rejectin_g this contention and holding for
the plaintiff, stated:
''It is argued that the evidence shows that
neither appellant nor its trainmaster ha'd control
or sup~ervision of the Dupo switchyard, which was
owned, operated and maintained by the Missouri
Pacifi.c Railroad Comp·any; hence it is claimed
that the status of appellant's trainmaster was no
more than that of a mere licensee. However,
app·ellant's trainmaster testified quite ·positively
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that his duties 'vere to supervise the appellant's
switching cre"'"S 'vhile in the Dupo yard, 'to get
the crews out of there,' and to 'tell them what
tracks to get in on to relieve the other part of the
yard.' Acting w·ithin the scope of such duties and
employment, the evidence shows that the trainmaster directed respondent, and the switching
crew of which he was a member, to use track No.
1 so that it seems to be clear that appellant retained the direction and control of the work of the
s'vitching crew in using the switchyard of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, an·d track No. 1
in said yard. It ha,.s been ruled by this eourt, and
by the courts of other jurisdictions, as well, that a
railro·ad company w·hich runs its engines and
tfiains .aver the t'"'acks -owned by ~anothe.r compan.y
is bottnd to know and to see that those track.s are
in a reasonably safe condition for use by its own
employees.
''In Ford v. Dickinson, Receiver, 280 Mo. 206,
loc. cit. 225, 217 S.W. 294, 300, it app,ears from the
statements of facts that a switchman, employed '
by the ·defendant receiver of the railway company,
was injured while using a track situated upon the
premises of a milling company, by reason of coming in contact with a post erected and maintained
by the milling company in close proximity to such
track. In that case, Judge Ragland (then commissioner), speaking for this division of this court,
said:
'' 'If the track was negligently maintained
dangerously near the post the receiver {of the
railway company) is liable. The master is hound
to exercise ordinary .care to make the place where
his employees work. reasonably safe, and where
he contracts to do the work on the p·ermises of
another, and retain direction an·d control of the
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work, the general ·rule applies, and he must exercise the same care for the safety of his employees that the law imposes on him on his own
rp~remises. Clark v. Foundry Co., 234 Mo. 436,
loc. cit. 454 (137 S.W. 577, 45 L.R.A. (N.'S·.) 295);
Penn. Steel Co. v. Nace, 113 Md. 460 (77 A. 1121,
45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 281). Defendant receiver was
not required by law to operate the switch tracks
in the millyard under conditions dangerous to his
employees, if it was practicable and feasible for
such dangerous ·conditions to be removed. If he
had no such control that he cou~d hav-e removed
such conditions himself, he could have required
the milling company to ha.ve ·done so, or refused,
until such change, to do its switching. Devine
v. Delano, 272 Ill. 166 ( 111 N.E. 742, · Ann. Cas.
1918A, 689).'
''In Kanawha & Michigan Railway Co. v.
Kerse, 239 U.S. 576, 36 S. Ct. 174, 60 L. Ed. 448,
an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (U. S. Comp. St. Sees. 8657-8665), a brakeman was injured upon the premises of a brewing
company by coming in contact with a timber,
erected by the brewing company over its private
switch track at a height of approximately 311!
feet above the top· of a boxcar .upon which the
em'P'loyee was standing in the performance of
his duties. Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the
federal Supreme Court, said :
_ '' 'The action of the railway company,
through its employees, in condu~ting its switching operations upon. a switch obstructed, as this
one was, in such manner as to endanger the
lives of brakemen upon its cars, sp·eaks so clearly
of negligence that no time need be spent upon
it. The evidence that the timber had been in
the position described for a considerable period
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of time was presumptive evidence of notice to
the company; besides which the switch engineer
and conductor both testified to actual knowledge
on their part, prior to the time of the accident
to Barry.'

*

*

* *

''In Doyle v. Railway Co., 127 Mic.h. 94, loc.
cit. 98, 86 N.W. 524, 526 (54 L.R.A. 461, 89 Am.
·St. Rep. 456), that court has said:
" 'The rule is established by the v1eight of
authority that, when a railroad company runs
its trains over the tracks owned by another, the
_company is bound to see that the tracks are in a
safe condition (citing authorities).'
''In Stetler v. Railway Co., 46 Wis. 497, loc.
cit. 502, 1 N.W. 112, 114, it is said:
'' 'The authorities are quite uniform, that
where one railroad company uses the track of
another company for the purpose of transporting
passengers or property, the company transporting the persons or property is liable for an;y
damages which may be sustained, either by the
passengers or by the owners of the property so
transported, caused by any defects in the road
of the other company so used, or by the negligence of the servants or employees of such other
comp'any occurring ·during such trransport.atvon.
* * * We are also of the opinion that the same
rule should apply as between the railroad company and its employees. * * * As between itself
and its employees, who were directed to use the
road in the business of the defendant comp·a.ny,
such employees have the right to treat the road
as the company's road, and the compawy as to
its employees was bound to see that such road,
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whilst so used for its benefit by its employees,
wa.s in such cond.ition as not to 111nnecessarily
endanger their lives o-r limbs.'

''In Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Ross,
142 Ill. 9, loc. cit. 14, 31 N.E. 412, 413 (34 Am~
St. R·ep. 49), the deceased, a switchman in appellant's employ, was killed by the derailment of a
car on which deceased was riding, while the car
was heing transferred to a defective switch track
of another railroad company. Said that court:
" 'It is claimed that the appellant is not
liable because the defective tracks did not belong
either to the ap~pellal}.t, or to the Wisconsin
Central Line. But the following propositions are
well established both by reason and authority:
A railroad company is responsible for accidents
caused by defective tracks; it is bound to exercise due care to safely carry the passengers and
property intrusted to it; it is therefore, its duty
to see to it that the road, which it uses for such
transportation, is safe and in good repair, whether
such road is owned by it or not; if it uses the
track of another company for such purpose, it
is liable for damages to its passengers or freight
by reason of defects in the road of such other
comp·any so used by it; this rule applies as
between the railroad company and its. employees.
There is no evidence that the deceased had any
knowledge of the defects in the track. Where
the employee of a railroad com'pany is directed
to use the road of another company in the business of his employer, he has the right to treat
such road as th'e road of the company employing
him; ·and every railroad c·omp,wny, w·ho SB emr
p·loyees use the road of another comp.any under
its direction or for its benefit, ·ow:es it as a duty
to such empZovyees to see that such ro·ad is not
1
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in a. condition which wi.ll unnecessa,rily endange.r
their lives or limbs.' ''
In Sal.zberg v. Grossnzan Nass1au Hotel Corpo~ation,
16 N.Y.S. 2d 811, 258 App,ellate Div. 926, the court
supported a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant and stated:
''The defendant may not escape liability
because of its failure to furnish a safe place to
work by asserting that the particular part of its
premises 'vhere the accident happened was not
within its control, since it employed the plaintiff to render services for it and directed her
to work in that portion of the premises. The
fact that such part of the premises was otherwise within the control of another individual is
immaterial. The defendant saw fit to require
plaintiff to work in that particular place and
under the evidence that particular place was not
a safe place to work.''
The principle .contended for by pl~ntiff herein is
set forth clearly and succinctly in Termin:al R. Ass'n of
St. Louis v. Fitzjohn, 165 F. 2d 473, 476 (8th Cir. 1948).
It a~ppeared in that case that the plaintiff, while working
for the defendant railroad company, was sent in the
performance of his duties as a foreman upon the .property of the United States Government at an Ordinance
Plant near St. Louis, Missouri, and that while riding
the side of a car along a loading ramp, was knocked
from the car by certain iron pipes and standards extending from the ramp·. It was contended vigorously hy the
defendant that because the railroad company did not
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own or 1n any manner or way whatsoever control or
have the right of control of the ramp and the'conditions
attendant thereto or the tr~cks, along which plaintiff
was riding, that the railroad company was not responsible. The court supported a judgment for the plaintiff
in the following language:
"Since plaintiff was an employee of defendant at the· time of his injury the fact that the
premises where plaintiff was sent to work did
not belong to and we·re not under the control
of defendant did not absolve defendant from
liability for their unsafe condition. In Albert
Miller & Co. v. Wilkins, 7 Cir., 209 F. 582, 584,
the Court stated the rule in the following language: ·
'' ' That a master is bound to use reasonable
care to provide a safe place in which his servant
may work is now too well established to require
citation of authority, and it can make no difference, so far as the servant is concerned, whether
the master is using his own property or that of
another. As was said in American Machinery
Co. v. Ferry, 141 Ky. (372), page 374, 132 S.W.
(546), page 547:
'' 'The master who contracts to do work on
the premises of another must exe~cise ordinary
care for the. safety of his servants there, no
less than on his own p·remises.'
''See also Labatt, Master & Servant. (2d Ed.),
Vol. 3, Chap. XL:V, Sec. 1073, p·p. 2835-2836,
Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Tennant, 1 Cir., 66 F.
1

922. ''

In Flao·dy v. Great N oll"the'ln Ry. Go., et ~al., 102
Minn. 81, 112 N.W. 875 plaintiff was a switchman in the
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employ of defendant, the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis
& Omaha Rail\Yay Company. It a·ppeared from the evidence that plaintiff's employer and the Great Northern
Railway Company jointly used a certain switch over
which both rail,vay companies operated and moved their
trains. \\Thile plaintiff was riding on the train of his
employer in the discharge of his duties, the Great Northern Company, by and through its employees, carelessly
and negligently failed to operate the switch, as a result
of which the train upon which plaintiff was riding was
derailed. The tracks over which the train was operating
were under the control and being operated by the Union
Depot Company. However, plaintiff's employer had the
right and privilege· of using the tracks and switches by
virtue of a private contract. The court stated:

"* * * The fact that the switch was imperfect
(if it was) does not relieve the Omaha Company
from the duty which it owed to plaintiff upon
the occasion of his injury. As we understand
the law, whether the engine was derailed by
reason of the defective switch, or on account of
the negligence of the switch tender in operating
it, that company is liable for the result. It is
not important whether the switch was operated
by the employees ·of the Union Depot Comp·any,
as a part of their regular duties, or whether they
operated this particular switch without the spe . .
cial authority of the Union Depot Company, and
for the accommodation of defendant companies.
We a.re satisfied that, as betw·een the Omaha
Cornparny and the pl·aintiff, the company accepted
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the serv~ices of the switchman on that particular
occasion to the sa.me extent as though he had
been in its emp·loy. * * *

'' * * * The Omaha Comtpany owed the duty
to plaintiff to use all reasonable diligence to
carry him safely in its engine out of the depot
yards, and it was immaterial to plaintiff whether
in so doing defendant op·erated its trains over
its own tracks and switches, over the tracks and
switches which it had leased from another company, or under a contract with the Union Depot
Company. It was immaterial to plaintiff that
the switchmen were paid by the Union Depot
Company, and were under its control in operating the switches, if, for the occasion, the Omaha
Company chose to avail itself of the services of
that company for its employees for the purpose
of taking its train out of the depot.''
For other cases holding_ fast to the general princi'P~les of law contended for by the plaintiff herein, see:
Rose v. Missouri D·ist. Telegtf,aph Co. and Rose v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. arnd Rose v. Union Electric Light
& Power ,Co., 43 S. W. 2d 5·62, 328 Mo. 1009; Burke v.
Boston & M. R. R. Co., 134 Atl. 574, (N.H. 1926);
Brock v. Ireland-Grafton Co., 141 Atl. 912 (N.H. 1928);
F<Jntenot v. R~aftery, 193 !So. 896 (L~a. 1940); RehOJrd v.
Miles, .et ·al., 284 N. W. 829 (Ia. 193.9) ; Ta'!Jlo·r v. J. A.
Jones ·Oonst. ·Go. et al., 195 N. Car. 30, 141 S. E. 492
'(1928); B·art;o v. low1a Tel. Go., 12H Ia. 241, 101 N. W.
876, 106· Am. St. Rep·. 347; Miner v. Franklin ·County Tel.
Go., 83 Vt. 311, 75 Atl. 653, 26 L .. R.A. (N.S.) 119·5;
Barnes v. Red River & G. R. R., 128 So. 724 (La. 1930).
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If the railroad company sends its employees upon
the premises of ·another to work where an unsafe and
hazardous condition exists and injury or death results,
its responsibility therefor is hardly possible of dispute.
This is true because the employer exclusively exercises
the choice as to where the employee is to petform his
work and has the exclusive duty, authority and ability
to c.ontrol and supervise all .safety factors at the place
of work. The same reason for the rule as to place of
work exists where the employer sends his employees
to a place where they are required to work daily and
customarily side by side with employees of other companies. Such condition exists throughout the railroad
system wherever the carrier delivers goods to ultimate
consignees and also wherever terminal stations· are used
to transfer goo.ds and p·assengers from one railroad
company to another. In all of these places employees
of the railroad company are required to perform the
work of loading and unloading, delivering and receiving
in conjunction with and while working alongside employees of other companies. The railroad companies
under such circumstances have control over all safety
factors, rules and regulations regarding the -work of
said employees. As a condition to sending. their employees upon such premises and as a condition to requiring
their employees to work alongside the employees of
such consignees or terminal companies, railroad companies may impose any rules, regulations or requirements which they desire. On the other hand the employee has no means of control by regulation or other- .
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wise over the activities, !conduct or manner of working
of em ployees of the other company. Under such circumstances it seems inconceivable that real or substantial distinction would or could he drawn between responsibility of the railroad company for unsafe static conditions on the premises of another and responsibility
for the active neglect of employees of another alongside
whom such company requires. its employees to work and
to perform the duties of their employment.
1

Furthermore, the work of loading and unloading
cars which make up interstate trains, regardless of who
does the work, is that of the railroad company. The
railroad cannot divorce itself from responsibility ·for
the manner in which such work is done merely by virtue
of the fact that it does not pay. the wages· of such employees or exercise direct supervisory control over them.
Of interest in this connection are cases where the existence of the employer-employee relationship is in disp·ute. Such a case is that of Jones v. George F. Getty Oil

Co., 92 F. 2d 255, 259, 263 (10 C.C.A.). In that ca~e plaintiff was employed by one Norwood in Texas to work on
certain oil drilling operations in New Mexico. The water
for this operation was to be furnished to Norwood by
the defendant. This water was to come from certain
wells on defendant's prop·erty. The wells came out of
repair· and Norwood was prevented from continuing
his drilling operations because there ~as no other available source for o_btaining water. Plaintiff, under the
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direction of Norwood's foreman, went to the property
of the defendant to assist in repairing the wells. This
foreman directed plaintiff to climb a ''gin pole,'' attach
a block to the top thereof and feed a pulley through the
block. Plaintiff was standing near the top of the pole,
pursuant to the aforesaid order, when a guy wire broke
allowing the pole to fall, injuring him.
In the performance of this work upon the premises
of the defendant the plaintiff was acting under the
direction, supervision an·d control of Norwood and Norwood's foreman. Plaintiff was not -at-any time or in any
manner acting under the direction, supervision or control of the defendant or any of its. employees. Plaintiff
accepted compensation under the Workmen's Compensation laws from Norwood and this suit was brought
against the defendant on the theory that he was a negligent third party. The court held that plaintiff was a
special employee of the defendant and hence his only
remedy was under the New Mexico Compensation Act.
The court stated:
''The controlling factor is: For whom is the
work being performed, and who had the power
to control the work and the employee? The authority to determine the work to he done, and
the m-anner in which it is to be carried on, necessarily includes the right to suspend or terminate
the work altogether or, possibly, to exclude the
particular emiployee from the job, not including
the right to discharge the employee from the
service of his general employer (Norwood), nor
need it include the actual giving of directions to
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the employee in connection with the work he is
doing.
'' Bill Wood, the foreman, and plaintiff, and
the other members, of Norwood's crew, had voluntarily entered upon said premises in said work
with the consent of said defendant, who was the
owner and in control, through his lease superintendent, Allen Stewart.

* * * *
''The ultimate test is: Whose is the work
being done~ Standard Oil Company v. Anderson,
supra. In determining whose work is· being done,
the question of the power to control the work
is of great importance (Standard Oil Company
v. Anderson, supra), hut is not conclusive (Linstead v. C. & 0. R. Co.; Hull v. Philadelphia &
R. R. Co. supra). The identity of the person who,
in fact, directs the details of the work and gives
the immediate instructions to the workmen is of
comparatively small importance, the power of
control referred to being the power to control
the undertaking as a whole. McLamb v. DuPont
Company, supra; Singer Mfg. Co. v~ Rahn,
supra.''
See also Linstead v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. !Co., 276 U.S.
28, 48 S. Ct. 241, 72 L.. Ed. 453; Standard Oil Co. v.
Anderson, 212· U.S. 215, 29 S. Ct. 252, 53 L. Ed. 480;
F·arw·ell v. Boston & Worcester R. R. :Corp., 4 J\Ietc. 49,
38 Am. De.c. 339; Denton v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 284
u.s. 305, 52 s.· ct. 141.
In the case at bar it is cle·ar that the terminal
company in loading and unloadin_g cars which made up
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road company and that the railroad company was therefore responsible for the manner in which that work was
being performed.
It is likewise clear that the defendant chose to rely
upon the terminal company employees in performing the
work of keeping and maintaining a track clear of baggag-e truck obstructions. When defendant made this
decision, it assumed responsibility for the manner in
which the work of terminal company employees was
performed.
(b)

Whether the defendant furnished pla.intiff a

reasonably safe place to work was a question of fact
for the jwry.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant railroad company,
knowing that switchmen and other of defendant's employees ,customarily rode engines and cars in a westerly
direction along the outside baggage track and p:ast the
baggage platform, nevertheless negligently left impaired
clearance between cars passing on said track and ten
baggage trucks which had been left along the baggage platform. The evidence abundantly supported
plaintiff's allegation. The ten haggage trucks, located
parallel to the track along the baggage platform, had
been placed and left between the yellow danger line
and the south edge of the iplatform. Furthermore, the
easternmost of said tracks was left approximately ten
feet from the eastern end of the platform, leaving little,
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if any, space within which plaintiff could dismount from
his position on the point car as it moved in a westerly
direction.
Uncontroverted evidence revealed that' plaintiff and
his crew rode the sides of cars past baggage trucks
located on the platform as often as six times a day on
some days, and that employees of other railroads did
likewise ( R. 49).
It is true that the Denver Union Terminal Company
employees handled and used the baggage trucks, leaving
the inference that such employees in all probability were
responsible for leaving the trucks in the danger zone
as heretofore indicated. We submit, however, that under
the foregoing facts a jury could well find that defendant
had violated its. continuing and non-delegable duty of
furnishing plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which
to work.
In determining whether the place where plaintiff
was working was safe, all safety 'precautions, if any,
taken by the defendant and also all precautions which
might h·ave been taken -must be considered and "All
inferences which reasonably may be drawn from the
evidence must be determined in plaintiff's favor, * * *"
Thomson v. Boles, 123 F. 2d 487.
In B~ai'ley v. Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 319 U.S.
350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 1064, 87 L. Ed. 1444, the court said:
''The nature of the task which Bailey undertook, the hazards which it entailed, the effort
which it required, the kind of footing he had,
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the space in which he could stand, the absence
of a guard rail, the height of the bridge above
the ground, the fact that the car could have been
opened or unloaded near the bridge on level
ground-all these were facts and circumstances
for the jury to weigh and appraise in determining
\\'"hether respondent in furnishing Bailey with
that particular place in which to perform the
task was negligent.''

In the case of Boston & M.R.R. v. Meech, 156 F. 2d
109, 111, (1 C.C.A. Cer. den. Oct. 28, 1946, 6·7 S. Ct. 124)
the deceased was performing the job of strip·ping engines. He was working on a structure just outside the
engine house known as the washstand, which consisted
of two parallel wooden platforms. At the time of his
death he was standing near the northerly edge of the
southe.rly platform in the path of but oblivious to the
approach of the locomotive which killed him. The case
was tried on two counts, the first being negligent operation of the locomotive, and the second being failure to
provide a reasonably safe place in which to work. The
court said:
''The sufficiency of the evidence to support
the verdict on the second count is at least equally
clear. The defendant might have painted lines
on the platforms of its washstan·d to indicate
the extent to which locomotives overhang them,
and thus to warn persons on the platforms of
the danger incident to standing near their inner
borders, or it might even have set the platforms
of its washstand back from the tracks far enough
to prevent locomotives from overhanging them
at all.
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''From the foregoing, it is clear that although
some precautions were taken for the decedent's
safety, further p,recautions were possible, and
from this it follows, as we read the decisions
cited above, that there was an 'evidentiary basis'
for submitting the issue of the defendant's
causal negligence to the jury, and hence that
our 'function is exhausted.' Lavender v. Kurn
et al., supra, ( 66 S. Ct. 744). Also we think it
evident from what we have said that although
the decedent eould readily have taken more care
than he did for his own safety either by standing
hack from the edge of the platform, or by watching more closely for locomotives coming in from
the yard, or by standing on the northerly platform
upon which his presence would normally be anticipated and where he would be in the hostler's
range of vision from the engineer's seat, still we
cannot say that as a matter of law his carelessness was the sole 'proximate -cause of the accident.''

A recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of
the United 1 S~tates regarding sufficiency of the evidence
for submission of_ questions of neglect to the jury for
determination is the case of Wilkerson v. McCarthy et
al., 336 U.S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 417, reversing the Utah
Supreme Court, 187 P. 2d 188. In that ease the plaintiff
was injured when he fell into a wheel pit while endeavoring to cross the pit by means of a plank. This court
supported the ruling of the trial court in directing a
verdict for defendant upon the general ground of insufficiency of the evidence to establish plain tiff's allegation of neglect on the part of the railroad company
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In failing to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe place
to work.
The United States Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Black, in holding that the case should have
been submitted to the jury, stated:
''There was, as the state court pointed out,
evidence to show that petitioner could have taken
a slightly longer route and walked around the
rpit, thus avoiding the use of the board. This
fact, however, under the terms of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, would not completely
immunize the respondents from liability if the
injury was 'in part' the result of respondents'
negligence. For while petitioner's failure to use
a safer method· of crossing might be found by the
jury to be contributory negligence, the Act provides that 'contributory negligence shall not bar
a recovery, but the damages shall he diminished
'by the jury in proportion to the amount of neglige~ce attributable to such employee * * *.'
"Much of respondents' argument here is
devoted to the proposition that the Federal Act
does not make the railroad an absolute insurer
against p·ersonal injury damages suffered by its
employees.. That proposition is correct, since the
Act imposes liability only for negligent injuries.
Cf. Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520,
69 S. Ct. 27'5. But the issue of negligence is one
for juries to determine according to their finding
of whether an employer's conduct measures up
to what a reasonable and p-rudent person would
have done under the same circumstances. And a
jury should hold a master 'liable for injuries
attributable to conditions un·der his control when
they are· not such as a reasonable man ought to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

maintain in the cir.cumstances', bearing in mind
that 'the standard of care must be commensurate
to the dangers of the business.' Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67, 63 S. Ct. 444,
451, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L·.R. 967.
"'There are some who think that recent decisions of this Court which have required submission of negligence question.s · to a jury make,
'for all practical purposes, a railroad an insurer
of its employees.' See individual opinion of
Judge. Major, Griswold v. Gardner, 7 Cir., 155
F. 2d 333, 334. But see Judge Kerner's dissent
from this view 155 F. 2d 333, at page 337 and
Judge Lindley's dissenting opinion 155 F. 2d
333, at pages 337, 338. This assumption, that
railroads -are made insurers where the issue of
negligence is left to the jury, is inadmissible.
It rests on another assumption, this one unarticula.ted, that juries will invariably decide negligence questions against railroads. This is contrary to fact, as shown for illustration by other
Federal Employers Liability eases, Barry. v.
Reading Co., 3 Cir., 147 F. 2d 129, certiorari
denied, 324 U.'S·. 867, 65 S. Ct. 912, 89 L. Ed.
1422; Benton v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co.,
Mo. Sup., 182 S.W. 2d 61, certiorari denied, 324
U.S. 843, 65 S. Ct. 676, 89 L. Ed. 1405. And cf.
Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 2d 649,
certiorari dismissed for reasons stated, 323 U.S.
673, 65 S. Ct. 126, 89 L . Ed. 547. Moreover, this
Court stated some sixty years a.go when considering the proper tribunal for determining questions
of negligence : 'We see no reason, so long as the
jury system is the law of the land -and the jury
is made the tribunal to decide disputed questions
of fact, why it should not decide such questions
as these as well as others.' Jones v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 U.S. 443, 445, 9 S. Ct.
?"\
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118, 32 L. Ed. 478. And peremptory instructions
should not be given in negligence cases 'where
the facts are in dispute, and the evidence in relation to them is that from which fair-minded men
may draw different inferences.' Washington &
G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U.'S·. 554, 572, 10· S. Ct.
1044, 1049, 34 L. Ed. 235. Such has ever since
been the established rule for trial and appellate
courts. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
318 U.S. 54, 67, 68, 63 S. Ct. 444, 4·51, 452., 87
L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.. R. 967. Courts should not
assume that in determining these questions of
negligence juries will fall sh-ort of a fair p·erformance of their constitutional function. In
rejecting a contention that juries could be expected to determine certain disputed questions
on whim, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Holmes, said: 'But it must be assumed th·at the
constitutional tribunal does its duty, and finds
facts only because they are proved.' Aikens v.
State of Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206, 25 S. Ct.
3, 6, 49 L. Ed. 154.
''In reaching its conclusions as to negligence,
a jury is frequently called upon to consider many
sep·arate strands of circumstances, and from these
circumstances to draw its ultim·ate conclusion
on the issue of negligence. Here there are many
arguments that could have been presented to the
jury in an effort to persuade it that the railroad's
conduct was not negligent, and many counter
arguments which might have p·ersuaded the jury
that the railroad was negligent. The same thing
is true as to whether p·etitioner was guilty -of
contributory negligence. Many of such arguments were advanced by the Utah Supreme Court
to support its finding that the tpe.titioner was
negligent and that the railroad was not. But the
argUments made by the State 'Supreme Court
1
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are relevant and a.pprop~riate ·only for consideration by the jury, the tribunal selected to pass on
the issues. For these reasons, the trial court
should have submitted the case to the jury, and
it was error for the Utah Supreme Court to
affirm its action in taking the case from the
jury."
In the present case it cannot he denied that the
railroad company could have done more in the discharge
of its duty to provide plaintiff and other of its employees
with a reasonably safe place in which to work. If we
assume, as we must, viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff, that the baggage t111:cks
were located in a danger zone and that their location
created ~ hazardous condition which contributed to
cause plaintiff's injuries, the question arises as to whether or not an evidentiary basis ·has been established
from which a jury could conclude that the railroad
company was negligent.
From the facts, what reasonable inferences could
be drawn by a jury~ The railroad company, as a condition to sending its men along the haggage track -and
p·ast the loading platform, could have required the Denver Union Terminal Company to park baggage trucks
in the center of the p·~atform rather than along the sides.
Being -aware of the curve in the track immediately east
of the platform the railroad company could have required the Denver Union Terminal Company employees
to p·a.rk baggage trucks not less than 50 feet from the
end of the platform so that men riding the sides of cars
along the outside baggage t:r;-a:ck would have adeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quate and sufficient space in which to dismount
or stop in event clearance was insufficient.
The railroad company could have adopted rules or
regulations governing its switching ~rews, requiring
them to stop cuts of cars before they reached the baggage platform an·d requiring the men who customarily,
to the knowledge of the railroad com,pany, rode the
sides of cars past the platform, to dismount and walk
to the platform.
If the railroad company chose to rely wholly and
entirely upon the Denver Union Terminal Comp~any and
its employees to maintain the track and platform in a
safe condition, as it apparently did in this ease, the
railroad company assume·d responsibility for the· manner in which such maintenance work was performed,
and to that extent terminal employees b·ecame the employees of the_ defendant for which defendant was
responsible. Many cases herein cited support this
proposition.
In the case of Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459,
68 S. Ct. 140, 142, plaintiff's complaint allege·d that
defendant require-d plaintiff, a 2·2-year-old female telegraph operator, to work alone between 11 :30 p.m. and
7 :30 a.m. in a building situated in an isolated part of
the railroad yards; that the defendant had reason to
know that the yards were frequented by dangerous
characters ; that the carrier failed to exercise reasonable
care to light the building and surroundings or to guard
or patrol it in any way, and that during the night an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

outsider criminally attacked plaintiff and that she sustained serious and p,ermanent injuries as a result. The
defendant filed a motion for judgment upon the pleadings which was granted by the trial court. The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's action. The
opinion of that court is set forth in 162 F. 2d 716. The
Supreme Court of the United States, however, reversed,
holding that the allegations of the complaint stated a
cause of action for th~ jury. We quote from the otpinion:
''In support of his motion for summary judgment respondent alleged, and petitioner did not
deny, that the assailant was not an employee of
the respondent and that the attack was criminal.
''The district court stated, in explanation of
its action, that there would be no causal connection 'between the injury and respondent's failure
to light or guard the premises, and that the law
does not permit recovery 'for the intentional or
criminal acts' of either a fellow-employee or an
outsider.
''We are of the opinion that the allegations
in the complaint, if supported by evidence, will
warrant submission to a jury. Petitioner alleged
in effect that respondent was aware of conditions
which created a likelihood that a young woman
performing the duties required of petitioner
would suffer just such an injury as was in fact
inflicted upon her. !That the foreseeable danger
was from intention or criminal misconduct is
irrelevant; respondent nonetheless had a duty to
make reasonable provision against it. Breach of
that duty would be negligence, and we cannot
say as a matter of law that petitioner's injury
did not result at least in part from such negliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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gence. The cases cited by the district court, we
believe, do not support the broad p·roposition
enunciated by it, and do not cover the fact situation set forth by the pleadings in this case.
''Certiorari is granted, and the judgment is
reversed and the case remanded to the district
court.''
In the Dillie case the person who attacked plaintiff
was a stranger, unassociated in any way with defendant,
and yet, because defendant could anticipate in view of
the surrounding circumstances that such a person might
attack plaintiff and could have taken ·additional measures
to provide plaintiff with a safe place to. work by lighting the area or ~patrolling the ground, a question for
the jury was presented.
The reasoning of the Lillie case is even more pertinent to the case at bar where it can hardly be denied
that the defendant railroad company could have taken
additional measures in provi.ding plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work. In either case if the
railroad company :chose to disregard its duty or to
allow others to iperform its duty it is nevertheless
responsible where the place of work is thereby rendered
unsafe. This is especially true in view of the 1939
amendment to the Federal Employers' Liability .Act
which abolishes the doctrine of assumption of risk in
all of its aspects.
We respectfully submit that whether 'defendant furnished plaintiff a reasonably safe place in 'vhich to
work was a question of fact for the jury's determination.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDIN,G AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS
INJURIES (statement of Points 1 and 2).

It is clear from the statement made by the trial
court to the jury following ~presentation of plaintiff's
evidence that one of the chief grounds upon which the
court relied in its ruling was that plaintiff was himself
guilty of negligence which was the sole proximate cause
of his injuries. The evidence fully revealed that plaintiff,
in riding the sill step of the leading car past the baggage
platform, was observing a customary, usual and wellestablished practice of which the railroad company was
well aware. He stationed himself on the leading car
at the point for the purpose of keeping a lookout ahead
and determining whether or not there were obstructions,
or people upon the tracks who might be endangered by
the movement of the cut of cars.
Plaintiff's testimony fully revealed that hy the time
he reached a position where he could determine that the
baggage trucks were in a danger zone he could not dismount or take any other measures to· insure his safety.
At most, his conduct was contributory negligence. ·The
trial court by its ruling disregarded the repeated admonitions of the United States Supreme Court and resurrected contributory negligence as a :complete bar to
recovery.
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In the case of Lavender v. K urn et al., 327 U.S.
645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 743, in an action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act for the death of a railroad
switch tender, there was evidence from which it could
be inferred that a mail hook swinging from the side of
a mail car struck the deceased. In order to so find the
jury would have had to infer that decedent was standing
on a raised mound of dirt which was the only place
where he could have stood and been struck by the hanging mail hook. At the trial the jury returned a verdict
in favor of plaintiff ·and the Missouri Supreme Court
at 189 S.W. 2d 253, reversed, holding that there was
insufficient evidence for presentation of issues of defendant's negligence to the jury. The United States
Supreme Court reversed ·and stated:
''It is true that there is evidence tending
to show that it was physically and mathematically
impossible for the hook to strike Haney. And
there are facts from which it might reasonably
be inferred that Haney was murdered. But such
evidence has become irrelevant upon app-eal, there
being a reasonable basis in the record for inferring that the hook struck Haney. The jury having
made that inference, the respondents were not
free to relitigate the factual disp·ute in a reviewing court. Under these circumstances it would be
an undue invasion of the jury's historic function
for an appellate court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, judge. the credibility of witnesses and
arrive at a conclusion opposite from the one
reache'd by the jury. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67, 68, 63 S. Ct. 444,
451, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967; Bailey v.
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Central Vermont R. R. Co., 319 U.S. 350, 353, 354,
63 S. Ct. 1062, 1064, 87 L. Ed. 1444; Tennant v.
Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S. Ct.
409, 412, 88 L. Ed. 520. S·ee also Moore, 'Recent
Trends in Judicial Interpretation in Railroad
Cases Under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act,' 29· Marquette L. Rev. 73.
1

"It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or the .evidence is such
that fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture
-is required on the part of those whose duty it is
to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to
them to be the most reasonable inference. Only
when there is a complete absence of probative
facts to support the conclusion reached does a
reversible error appear. But where, as here,
there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's ver. diet, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve
whatever facts are inconsistent with its c·on-elusion. And the appellate -court's function is
exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes
apparent, it being immaterial that the court might
draw a contrary inference or feel that another
conclusion is more reasonable.
''We are unable, therefore, ·to sanction a
reversal of the jury's verdict against Frisco's
trustees. Nor can we rupprove any disturbance
in the verdict as to Illinois Central. The evidence
-was ·uncontradicted that it was very dat·k at the
place where Haney was wor_king and the surrounding ground was high and uneven. The evidence also showed that this area was entirely
within the domination and control of Illinois
Central ·despite the fact that the area was technieally located in a public street of thP City of
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~Ien1phis.

It was not unreasonable to conclude
that these conditions constituted an unsafe and
dangerous working place and that such conditions
contributed in part to Haney's death, assuming
that it resulted primarily from the mail hook
striking his head. ''
In Co.ray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S. Ct.
275, 277, the evidence revealed that de-cedent's death
oceurred when a one-man flat-top motorcar crashed into
the back end of an eighty-two car freight train on a
main line track at a point near Lemay, Utah. The train
unexpectedly stopped just before the crash occurred
because the air in its brake lines escaped as a result of
the violation of the Federal Safety Ap·pliance Act.
Decedent was in control of the motorcar but ap,parently
was looking in another direction and did not api)Jy the
brakes. The trial court directed a verdict for the railroad company at the conclusion of the evidence and the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in an opinion set
forth at 185 P. 2d 963, supported the trial court's ruling,
holding that the defective appliance was not R -''legal''
cause of the crash and of the death of decedent. 'The
United States Supreme Court granted plaintiff's petition for certiorari an·d reversed an·d in discussing the
matter of causation ·stated:
"Second. 'The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the evidence here and held as a matter of law
that the defective equipment did not p·roximately
·cause or contribute to the decedent's denth. That
court discusse·d distinctions between 'proximate
cause' in the legal sense, deemed a sufficient
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cause to impose liability, ·and 'cause' in the
'philosophical sense,' deemed insufficient to impose liability. It considered the sto pping of this
train to have been a cause of decedent's death
in the 'philosophical sense' in that the stopping
created 'a condition upon which the negligence
of plaintiffs' intestate operated,' one perhaps of
many causes 'so insignificant that no ordinary
mind would think of them as causes.' The court
added, however, that the stopping 'was not the
legal cause of the result,' thereby classifying it
as not 'a substantial, as well as actual factor in
bringing ·about' the decedent's death. This conclusion was reached in part upon the reasoning
that 'The leak in the . triple valve caused the
train to stop, because as a s-afety device, it was
designed to do just that.' .
1

''The language selected by Congress to fix
liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct.
Consideration of its meaning hy the introduction
of dialectical subtleties can serve no useful interpretative puf1Pose. The statute declares that railroads shall he responsible for their en1ployees'
deaths 'resulting in whole or in part' from defective appliances such as were here maintained.
45 U.S.C. .S-ec. 51, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 51. And to
make its purpose crystal clear, Congre;ss has also
provided that 'no such employee * * * shall be
·held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case' where a violation of the Safety
Appliance Act, such as the one here, 'contributed
to the· * * * death of such employee.' 45 U.S.C.
Sec. 53, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 53. Congress has thus
for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety
obligations upon railroads ·and has commanded
that if a breach of these obligations 'contributes
in part to an employee's de-ath, the· railroad must
'pay damages. These air-brakes were defective;
1
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for this reason alone the train suddenly and unexpectedly stopped; a motor track car following
at about the same rate of sp·eed and operated
by an employee looking in another direction
crashed into the train; all of these circumstances
were inseparably related to one another in time
and space. The jury could h·ave found that decedent's de·ath resulted from any or all of the·
foregoing circumstances. ''
The Coray case presents a striking parallel to the
case at bar. In the Coray case decedent was himself
the driver of the motorcar which ran into the rear end
of the stopped train. The stop·ping of the train was a
result of a defective safety appliance, and therefore violated the Federal Safety Appliance Act.
In the case at har the negligence complained of is
the leaving of baggage trucks in a danger zone. The
problem of causation is identical in each case and the
Supreme Court of the United States has set at rest this
issue in the aforementioned opinion.
The trial court has in effect revived the common
law 'doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence in holding that plaintiff's negligence was the
sole proximate cause of his injuries, and has fallen into
the error discussed in the case of Tille.r v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 318 U.iS;. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63. S. Ct. 444,
451, wherein the court stated:
''The doctrine of assumption of risk cannot
be 'abolished in toto' and still remain jn partial
existence as the court helow suggests. The theory
that a servant is completely barred from recovery
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for injury resulting from his master's negligence,
which legislatures have sought to eliminate in
all its various forms of contributory negligence,
the fellow servant rule, 'and assumption of risk,
must not, contrary to the will of Congress, be
allowed recrudescence under any other label in
the common law lexicon***''
POINT III.
THE TRIAL-COURT WRONGFULLY DEPRIVED PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY.

Under the controlling decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, the right of trial by jury
under the F.E.L.A., has been jealously and zealously
guarded.
In the recent, and much cited case of Bailey v.
Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 87 L. Ed. 1444,
· 63 S. ·ct. 1062, 1064, the· Supreme Court of the United
States stated:
"The right to trial by jury is 'a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of federal
jurisp·rudence.' Jacob v. New York City, 315
U.S. 752, 86 L. Ed. 1166, 62 S. Ct. 854. It is part
and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under the Employers' Liability Act. R-easonable care and cause and effect are as elusive here
as in other fields. But the jury has heen chosen
as the appropriate tribunal to apply those standards to the facts of these personal injuries. That
method of determining the liability of the carriers and of placing on them the cost of these
industrial accidents may be crude, archaic, and
expensive as compared with the more modern
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systems of workmen's c.omp·ensation. But however inefficient and backward it may be, it is
the system which Congress has provided. To
deprive these workers of the benefit of a jury
trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away
a goodly portion of the relief which Congress
has afforded them.''

In the case of Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S.
752, 62 S. Ct. 854, 86 L. Ed. 1166, Mr. Justice Murphy;
speaking for the court, stated:
"The right of jury trial in civil cases at
common law is a hasic. and fundamental feature
of our system of federal jurisprudence, which
is protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right
so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether
guaranteed by the c.onstitution or provided by
statute, should be jealously guarded by the
courts.''
In speaking of this rule the United :states Supreme
Court in the case of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Lime R. Co.,
318 U.S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63 S. Ct. 444, 451, stated:

'' * * * Many years ago this Court said of the
'P'roblems of negligence, 'We see no reason, so
long as the jury system is the law of the land,
and the jury is made the tribunal to decide disputed questions of fact, why it should not decide
such questions as these as well as others. ' Jones
v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 128 U.S. 443, 445,
9 S. Ct. 118, 32 L.. Ed. 478. Or as we have put it
on another occasion, 'Where the facts are in
dispute, and the evidence in relation to them is
that from which fair-minded men may draw difSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ferent inferences', the case should go to the
jury. so"

F oo tnote 30 : "Washington, etc.,· R. Co. v.
McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 572, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 1049,
1050, 34 L. Ed. 235. See, also, Kane v. North
Cent. R. Co., 128 U.S. 91, 95, 96, 9 S. Ct. 16, 17,
18, 32 L. Ed. 339; Hough v. Texas & Pac. Co.,
supra, 100 U.S. 225, 25 L. Ed. 612; Jacob v.
City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 757, 62 :s. Ct.
854, 856, 86 L. Ed. 1166. It appears to be the
clear Congressional intent that, to the maximum
extent proper, questions in actions arising under
t~e Act should he left to the jury : * * * ''
1

From the opinion in the recent case of Term.inal
R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Schorb, 151 F. 2d 361, 365, we
quote the following interesting language:

'' * * * One of the main purposes of the Federal Employers' Liability Act was to modify
the common law barriers against recovery by an
employee in a suit against hi s employer predicated on an industrial aecident. Tiller, Executor,
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63
S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.. R. 967. ·The
right to jury trial constitutes a part of the remedy afforded by the act and employees must not
be deprived of that right in close or doubtful
cases. Bailey, Administratrix, v. Central V ermont Ry., Inc., 319· U.S. 350, loc. cit. 354, 63 S.
Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444. It was for the jury, as
the fact finding body, to weigh the evidence and
judge credibility. Tennant, Administratrix, v.
Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct.
409, 88 L. Ed. 520; Crain v. Illinois Central R.
Co., 335 Mo. 658, 73 S. W. 2d 786, certiorari denied
293 U.S. 607, 55 '8·. Ct. 123, 79 L. Ed. 698. On
1
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this app·eal we n1ust view the evidence and inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in thelight most favorable to plaintiff. Chic~go, St.
P., :hi. & 0. R. Co. v. Muldowney, 8 Cir., 130 F.
2d 971, certiorari denied, 317 U.S. 700, 63 S. Ct.
526, 87 L. Ed. 560. ''

In the recent case of GriswDld v. Gardner, (C.C.. A.
7, May 15, 1946), 155 F. 2d 333, the court said:
''Any detailed review of the evidence in a
case of this character for the purpose of determining the prop·riety of the trial court's refusal
to direct a verdict would be an idle and useless
ceremony in the light of the recent decisions of
the Supreme Court. T·his is so regardless of
what we might think of the sufficiency of the
evidence in this resp·ect. The fact is, so we think,
that the Supreme Court has in effect converted
this negligence statute into a comp·ensation law
thereby making, for all practical purpose~s, a
railroad an insurer of its employees. (S·ee dissent of Mr. Justice Roberts in Bailey v. Central
Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 358, 63 S. Ct. 1062,
1066, 87 L. Ed. 1444.)
''The Supreme Court,· commencing with Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R. Co., 318 .U.S. 54, 63
:s. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967, in a
succession of cases has reversed.every court (with
one exception hereinafter noted) which ha;s held
that a defendant was entitled to a directed verdict. In the Tiller case, the Sup~reme Court reversed the Cou·rt of Appeals for the Fourth [Circuit, 128 F. 2d 420, which had affirmed the District Court in 'directing a verdict. The case, u~on
remand, was again tried in the court below, where
a directed verdict was denied. For this denial the
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Court of Appeals reversed and again the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the District Court properly submitted
the case to the jury. In Tennant v. Peoria &
P. U. R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed.
520, this court reversed the ·District Court on account of its refusal to direct a verdict, and our
decision, 134 F. 2d 860, wa.s reversed by the Supreme Court. In Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry.,
319 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444, the
Supreme Court of Vermont held tha.t there should
have been a directed verdict for the defendant,
and the Supreme Court reversed the decision of
that court. In Blair v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.,
323 U. S. 600, 65 S. Ct. 545, 89 L. Ed. 490, the
Suprem·e Court reversed the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania which had held that there should
have been a directed verdict. In the recent case
of Lavender, Administrator, etc., v. Kurn et al.,
66 S. Ct. 740, the :supreme Court reversed the
Supreme Court of. Missouri which had held that
there should have been a directed verdict for
each of the defendants.
1

''The only exception to this unbroken line
of decisions is Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320
U.S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 232, 88 L.. Ed. 239, where the
Supreme Court of North Carolina was affirmed in
its holding that there should have been a directed
verdict. This excep~tion, however, is of little consequence in view of the fact that four members
of the court dissented.
''The case of Lavender _v. Kurn, supra, the
latest decision of the ·S·upreme Court, under the
Federal Employers . Liability Act, leaves little
room for doubt but that a directed verdict by a
trial court for a holding by any court sustaining
a directed verdict will not meet with favor, even
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though the verdict involves speculation and conjecture. In the Lavender case, the Missouri Supreme Court, '189 S.W. 2d 253, 259, held: '* * *
that it would be mere sp·eculation and conjecture
to say that Haney was struck hy the mail hook,
and we are constrained. to rule that plaintiff
failed to make a submis sible case on that question.' In response to this holding the Supreme
_ Court states ( 66 S. Ct. 744) : 'It is no answer to
say that the jury's verdict involves speculation
and conjecture.' A reading of the facts of that
case, both as related by the Supreme Court and
the Supreme Court of Missouri, reveals very
clearly that the jury's verdict as to the cause ·
of decedent's death, especially as it applies to
the Illinois Central Railroad, amounted to nothing more than a guess on its part.
''That the Supreme Court treats the question
of negligence and proximate cause as a jury
question in this class of cases is clearly shown
by a study of these cases. Moreover, not only
are these issues to be decided by the jury but its
decision is unassailable. In fact, it is difficult
to conceive of a case brought under thi:s Act where
a trial court would be justified in directing a verdict.''
1

For similar holdings see Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S.
645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 692; Cogswell v. Chi.oa,go &
Ea:stern Ill. R. R. Co., 328 U.~S:. 820, 66 S. Ct. 1122, 90
L. Ed. 945; Keeton v. Thompson, Trustee in Bankruptcy
for Mo. Pac. R. R. ·Co., 66 S. Ct. 135, reversing the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 183- S.W. 2d 505; J esionow'Ski
v. Boston & Mali,rn R. R., 329 U.S. 452, 67 S. Ct. 401;
Ellis v. Union Pacific R. R ..Qo., 329 U.S. 649~ 67 S. Ct.
598.
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In Wilkerson v. McCarthy et ·al., supr.a, 336 U.S. 53,
69 S. Ct. 413, 420, the Supreme Court of the United
!States speaking through Mr. ·Justice Dou_glas in a concurring opinion, discussed the purpose of our Congress
in enacting the Federal Employers' Liability Act in
insuring to injured railroad employees and their families
their constitutional right of trial by jury in the following
language:
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act was
designed to put on th~ railroad industry some of
the cost for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which
it consumed in its operations. Not all these costs
were imposed, for the Act did not make the employer the insurer. The liability which it imposed
was the liability for neg·ligence. But judges had
created numerous defenses-fellow-servant rule,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence-so
that the employer was often effectively insulated
from liability even though it was responsible for
maintenance of unsafe conditions of work. The
purpose of the Act was to change that strict rule
of liability, to lift from employees the '~prodigious
burden' of personal injuries which that system
had placed upon them, and to relieve men 'who
by the exigencies and necessities of life are bound
to labor' from the risks and hazards that could be
avoided or lessened 'by the exercise of proper care
on the part of the employer in providing safe and
proper machinery and equipment with which the
employee does his work.'
''That purpose was not given a friendly reception in the courts. In the first place, a great
maze of restrictive interpretations were engrafted
on the Act, constructions that deprived the beneficia.ries of many of the intended benefits of the
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legislation. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton,
233 U.S. 492, 34 S. Ct. 635, 58 L. Ed. 1062, L.R.A
1915C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475; Toledo, St. L .. &
W. R. Co. v. Allen, 276 U.S. _165, 48 S. Ct. 215,
72 L. Ed. 513 ; and the review of the cases in
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S.
54, 62-67, 63 S. Ct. 444, 448-451, 87 L. Ed. 610,
143 A.L.R. 967. In the second rp~lace, doubtful
questions of fact were taken from the jury and
resolved by the courts in favor of the employer.
This Court led the way in overturning jury verdicts rendered for employees. See Chicago, M.
& St. P. R. Co., v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472, 46 S. Ct.
564, 70 L. Ed. 1041; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Aeby,
275 U.S. 426, 48 S. Ct. 177, 72 L. Ed. 351; New
York Central R. Co. v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486,
50 S. Ct. 198, 74 L. Ed. 562. And so it was that
a goodly portion of the relief which Congress
had provided employees was with-held from them.
'' The first of these obstacles which the courts
had created could be removed by Congre:ss. In
1939 Congress did indeed move to release the employees from the burden of assumption of risk
which the Court had reimposed on them. 53 Stat.
1404, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 54, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 54; Tiller
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra. The second
evil was not so readily susceptible of Congressional correction under a :system where liability
is bottomed on negligence. Since the condition
was one created hy the Court and beyond effective control by Congress, it was appropriate and
fitting that the Court correct it. In fact, a decision not to ·correct it was to let the administration
of this law be governed not by the aim of the
legislation to safeguard employees but by a hostile philosophy that p·ermeated its interpretation .
1
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''The basis of liability under the Act is and
'remains negligence. Judges will not always agree
as to what facts are necessary to establish negligence. We are not in agreement in all cases. But
the review of the cases coming to the Court from
the 1943 Term to date and set forth in the A~ppen
dix to this opinion shows, I think, a record more
faithful to the design of the Act than previously
p·revailed.
''Of the 55 petitions for cer:tiorari filed during
this period, 20 have been granted. Of these one
was granted at the instance of the employer, 19
at the instance of an employee. In 16 of these
cases the lower court was reversed for setting
aside a jury verdict for an employee or taking the
case from the jury. In 3 the lower court was sustained in taking the case from the jury. In the one
case granted at the instance of the employer we
held that it had received the jury trial on contributory negligence to which it was entitled. In these
20 cases we were unanimous in 10 of the decisions
which we rendered on the merits.
"Of the 35 :P·etitions denie·d, 21 were by employers claiming that jury verdicts were erroneous or that new trials should not have been
ordered. The remaining 14 were filed by employees. In 10, of these the lower court had withheld the case from the jury and rendered
judgment for the ·employer, in 3 it had sustained
jury verdicts for the e:q1ployer and in 1 reversed
a jury verdict for the employee and directed
a new trial.
''From this group of cases three observations can be made:
'' ( 1) The basis of liahili ty has not been
shifted from negligence to absolute liability.
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'' ( 2) The criterion governing the exercise
of our discretion in granting or denying certiorari
is not who loses below but whether the jury function in passing on disputed questions of fact
and in dra,ving inferences from i>'roven facts has
been respected.
·The historic role of the jury in performing that function, see Jones v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R~ Co., 128 U.S. 443, 445, 9 S. Ct.
118, 32 L. Ed. 478; Washington & G. R. Co. v. ·
McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 572, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 1049,
1050, 34 L. Ed. 235; Bailey v. Central Vermont
Ry., supra, is being restored in this inmportant
class of cases.''
'' (3)

See also .Anderso'Yp v. Atchison, Topeka wnd Sa;nta

Fe Ry. Ca., 16 L. W. 4375; Lilllie v. Thompson, 332 U.IS'.
459, 68 S. Ct. 140; ,Car.ay v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S.
520, 69 S. Ct. 275; P.ooly v. McCarthy et al., 109 Utah 398.
166 P. 2d 501, 67 S. Ct. 102, 329 U.S. 6'98, 109 1Ttah 431,
184 P. 2d 123, 67 S. Ct. 962, 330 U.S. 802.

In the case at bar there was an evidentiary basis
from which a jury could find that defendant railroad
company negligently sent plaintiff into a place which
was not reasonably safe and that said unsafe condition
contributed as a cause of his injuries. This being true,
plaintiff was entitled under the foregoing authorities
to his constitutional right of trial by jury.
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CONCL.USION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court
committed error in holding as a matter of law that
defendant was not negligent and that plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. 'The
trial court by its rulin_g depTived plaintiff of his inherent
constitutional right to a fair an·d impartial trial by jury
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the judgment should be reversed and the :cause remanded to the
District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for
the County of ~salt Lake, for a jury trial.
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
BLACK & RO·BERTS
WAYNE L. BLACK
Attorneys for Plaintiff a;nd
Aippellant
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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